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ON THE STUDY OF LEGAL SCIENCE
CASSIUS J. KEYSER
Among the more significant terms in this article there are two
of paramount importance-Mlathematics and Science. Rightly
understood they are probably the weightiest terms in the vocabu-
lary of rational thought. But these great terms, though spoken
or written by all, though heard and seen on every hand, are sel-
dom employed with anything like a critical understanding of their
respective significations. In common parlance they are never so
employed; and it must be said that, with rare exceptions, eminent
scholars themselves, even in their gravest discourses, employ
them with but slight regard to precision and clarity of meaning.
Clarity is no doubt the highest stylistic obligation of an author
to a reader whose strongest desire is the desire to understand.
Clarity, however, is not easy to achieve; and in an essay dealing
succinctly with a vast and intricate subject one may not reason-
ably hope that all of one's statements are quite without ambiguity
or indetermination. Yet it must be held to be the minimal require-
ment of such an essay that its major theses shall be so presented
that no competent and attentive reader need remain in doubt as
to what it is that such theses assert. In order to meet that re-
quirement in the present case it is necessary to indicate in ad-
vance, as clearly as may be done in a few words, the respective
senses in which the term mathematics, the term science, and
various derivative terms are to be employed throughout the dis-
cussion.
To indicate the sense in which the term mathematics is to be
understood I have only to report what centuries of criticism have
at length shown us that mathematics essentially and distinctively
is. But for the term science my task is enitirely different. For
this term has never been defined and so there is no existing
definition of it to report. In saying this I assume that the reader
is well aware of the radical difference between definition and
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description. In what is called scientific literature there are to
be found many more or less apt partial descriptions of what the
writers have variously supposed the term science to represent,
but neither in that literature nor elsewhere have I been able to
find anything that may, properly speaking, be called a definition
of science. In order to indicate clearly the sense in which the
term is to be understood in this essay, I am, therefore, obliged to
construct, instead of merely reporting, a definition of the term.
It will be found, I believe, that the definition which I intend to
submit, not only does not contravene anything of essential im-
portance in the descriptions above alluded to, but has, moreover,
the immense advantage of assigning to the term science a signifi-
cation as definite as that of mathematics or of any other term
in speech. The reader may find it worth noting that neither the
reported definition of mathematics nor the proposed definition
of science is methodological but that both of the definitions are
based upon the kinds of propositions-the two natural proposi-
tional types-with which, it is held, mathematics and science
(rightly conceived) respectively deal.
The function of propositions is to answer questions. Questions
are of two kinds: questions regarding the make-up of the actual
world and questions regarding the make-up of the world of possi-
bility. The former kind may be simply exemplified by such
questions as these: What is the specific gravity of iron? What
are the essential functions of government? What is the shape
of the earth? What is the social value or effect of the human
sense of obligation? What is the velocity of light? Questions
regarding the world of the possible may be simply exemplified
by such as these: If the geometric axioms of Lobachevski were
valid, what other propositions would then necessarily be valid?
If there were a 4-dimensional space related to ordinary (Euclid-
ean) space as the latter is related to an ordinary plane, what
would be the geometric structure of that 4-dimensional world?
If John Doe were in Chicago, at the time when it is alleged, he
stabbed Richard Roe in New York, what other relevant proposi-
tion or propositions would of necessity be true?
Corresponding to the two great question-types, which together
embrace all possible questions, there are two natural types of
propositions, which together embrace all possible propositions:
categorical propositions, saying that such-and-such is the case,
in response to questions relating to the actual world; and hypo-
thetical propositions, which say that, if such-and-such supposable
things were actual, then of logical necessity such-and-such other
things would be so too, in response to questions about the possible
world.
More precisely, if p and q be propositions, then the proposition,
p implies q, meaning that q is logically deducible from p, is hypo-
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thetical; all other propositions are categorical. It is common
and convenient, though often misleading, to state hypothetical
propositions in the form: if p, then q; misleading because cate-
gorical propositions are often put in that form. For example,
the proposition that the orbit of the earth is an ellipse is cate-
gorical and it does not cease to be such when stated in the if-then
form: if 0 be the orbit of the earth, then 0 is an ellipse. Again,
the proposition-If Doe strikes Roe, then Roe will get angry-
is categorical; it does not mean to assert that "Doe strikes Roe"
implies "Roe will get angry;" in other words, the proposition does
not intend to assert logical deducibility. The form, p implies q,
should be taken as the staizdard form of hypothetical proposi-
tions, p being the hypothesis or implier and q the consequence
or implicate.
Mathematics is the enterprise having for its aim to establish
hypothetical propositions.
Science is the enterprise having for its aim to establish cate-
gorical propositions.
The two enterprises together embrace the whole knowledge-
seeking activity of man.
A mathematical proposition is an established hypothetical
proposition.
A scientific proposition is an established categorical proposi-
tion.
By the phrase, an established proposition, is meant a proposi-
tion that is so spoken of, so regarded, so treated by all or nearly
all authorities in the subject or field to which the proposition
belongs. It is evident that an established proposition has a date
or dates, for a proposition may, during a period of time, be an
established proposition and then cease to be such. I need not
give examples.
Mathematical method consi6ts of all the means available for
establishing hypothetical propositions, logical deduction being
the ultimate test in every case.
Scientific method consists of all the means available for estab-
lishing categorical propositions, observation being the ultimate
test in every case.
FORM AND CONTENT
It is essential to note and to keep in mind that a mathematical
proposition has, strictly speaking, no content, or subject matter.
For if p implies q, the deducibility of q from p depends only on the
forms of p and q and not at all on their content (if they happen
to have any) and, as already said, it is such deducibility and
nothing else that a mathematical proposition asserts. On the
other hand, a scientific proposition always has content, or sub-
ject-matter, for it is a categorical proposition purporting to an-
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swer a question respecting some portion or feature of the actual
world. It would be difficult to exaggerate the critical importance
of the distinction signalized in the last three sentences.
THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF LEGAL SCIENCE
Such distinctions 1 as I have now very briefly, perhaps too
briefly and imperfectly, indicated, are essential to the meaning
of the following remarks regarding the study of legal science.
Every branch of science has a subject-matter of its own-
some group of natural phenomena-some fragment or aspect of
the actual world. If the study of law is, or is to be, the study
of a branch of science, then it must deal with a group of natural
phenomena, with a part of the actual world, with some peculiar
type of subject-matter.
What is that subject-matter?
In my present view the answer is: the subject-matter of legal
science is a certain species of human behavior-I mean the dis-
tinctive behavior of those persons whose official r~le in human
society is to answer, for the community they represent, such
questions as arise respecting what is just. In a word, the subject-
matter of legal science is the decisions (the distinctive behavior)
of judges. In making these statements I am not unaware of the
ambiguity attaching to the terms, "decision" and "just." I trust,
however, that the meaning of the statements, interpreted con-
textually, will be sufficiently clear for the purpose they are to
serve.
The subject-matter indicated is a perfectly natural subject-
matter. It is a genuine part of the natural world. It is some-
thing to be observed and studied like any other part. Human
beings are literally a part of nature. It is essential to realize
that a society or community of our human kind is just as natural
as the ground they occupy, as theair they breathe, as the light
and heat of their great fire-side, the Sun. The many-colored
stream of human life is literally a part of the cosmic stream.
Looked upon objectively, the stream of human life presents many
sorts of phenomena-some for the psychologist, some for the
moralist, some for the religionist or theologian, some for the
physician, some for the political scientist, and so on. Among the
various types of natural phenomena observable in the flowing
spectacle of the life of human society, there is present also a
most notable group of phenomena constituting the jural type-
the distinctive acts or deeds or performances or decisions of
judges-the behavior of the judiciary as such. That behavior
1For a full discussion of these and kindred distinctions the reader may
be referred to my Tim PASTURES OF WONDER: THE REALMi OF MATHE-
MIATICS AND SCIENCE (1929).
ON THE STUDY OF LEGAL SCIENCE
is a genuine part of the life of mankind; it is, like human beings
themselves, as natural as anything else in the natural world;
it is, if you wish so to view it, literally a part of cosmic behavior;
and it is, I submit, the subject-matter of legal science.
WHAT WILL LEGAL SCIENCE CONSIST OF?
A branch of science may be viewed as an enterprise or as a
body of propositions. From what has been said it appears that,
regarded as a body of propositions, the science of law will con-
sist of categorical propositions setting forth the distinctive be-
havior of the judiciary together, of course, with the stimuli
calling it forth and the circumstances conditioning it.
Regarded as an enterprise legal science will have for its aim
the establishment of such categorical propositions.
NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
Is what I have been saying just an ignorant layman's crude
attempt to state the ordinary conventional conception of stare
decisis? I am quite prepared to admit the ignorance and the
crudeness but am far from being prepared to admit that the
usual concept of stare decisis is equivalent to the concept I have
been trying to set forth.
BRANCHES OF LEGAL SCIENCE
Thus far, I have been speaking of a science of law in general.
It is, of course, obvious that legal science will have numerous
branches. There will be a science of the law of contracts, a
science of the law of agency, a science of the law of torts, and
so on and on. Each of these will have for its subject-matter a
part of juridical behavior. And it is plain that each of the in-
dicated branches of legal science will have sub-branches accord-
ing as the inquiry relates to this, that, or another community or
state, it being understood that two communities may exist at the
same time in different places or at different times in the same
place.
EMERGENCE OF A GREAT PROBLEM
It seems evident that a great problem-a problem of compara-
tive law-would be that of ascertaining: (1) what, if any,
propositions are common to the various time-and-place subdivi-
sions of a given branch (say that of contracts) ; (2) what, if
any, propositions are common to all branches of a given time or
place; (3) what, if any, propositions are common to all branches
of all times and places.
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THE QUESTION OF PREDICTION
It is a familiar and just saying that a test of a science is that
a genuine science makes it possible to predict. An attempt to
predict based on legal science or a branch thereof employs the
assumption or postulate that a given pattern of judicial behavior
will repeat itself when the corresponding stimuli and condition-
ing circumstances repeat themselves. Is the postulate sound?
It is a fact that stimuli and circumstances seldom or never do
repeat themselves exactly. That fact being sufficient to explain
why exact prediction of judicial behavior is impossible, we need
not deny the validity of the postulate upon which attempted
prediction depends.
LAW IS A VARIANT FUNCTION OF VARIABLES
The fact is obvious that the cosmic stream including the stream
of human life goes flowing on; the new is ever emerging with-
out exact repetition of the old; and, inasmuch as judicial behavior
is a part of the life of mankind, we should expect, what we see
to be a fact, that law is not an invariant somewhat but is a
variable, changing with time and place and the things that these
involve.
Law (judicial behavior) changes because the stimuli that
evoke it and the circumstances that condition it do not remain
the same and do not repeat precisely but continually alter under
the influence of new things emerging endlessly in the flux of
life and the world.
We are thus led to employ the scientific notion of functionality
in the study of legal science. It is a well known fact of observa-
tion that law (judicial behavior) depends upon and varies with
a variety of more or less familiar variables. And so in functional
notation we may write
L(v 1, V2. v,, : . • )
merely to indicate the thought that the law L is a function of
certain variables v,,, v2.• and undergoes changes due to changes
in them.
Immediately certain queries and facts stare us in the face.
(1) What are the variables v? As a very rough suggestion
we might assign meanings to the v's as follows:
v, stands for modes and forms of business,
v2 stands for manners, , customs, mores,
v, stands for religious opinion and feeling,
v, stands for science and invention,
v, stands for industrial development,
v, stands for political theory,
v7 stands for axiology,
and so on.
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(2) If we give the v's some such meanings as those indicated,
we immediately see that, though the variables are distinct, they
are not independent of each other. In that case our function L
is a function of numerous variables each of which is at the same
time a function of all the others. Thus arise new problems of
functional relationship-complications that students of legal
science have to face.
(3) Is it possible to find or select a set of variables v such
that they shall be at once independent and ehdaustive? Is it
probable that such a set exists?
(4) If we make any reasonable specification of what the v's
are to represent, then, though we know that L depends upon
them, we do not know how it depends upon them; that is to say,
we do not know in advance, as we often do in mathematics, the
form of our function L. On the contrary, the form of L remains
to be discovered, if possible. But that fact is to be expected,
for scientific functions, unlike many mathematical functions, are
not given in advance. I mean that their forms are not lmovm
in advance but require to be ascertained by observation of the
facts to which they relate.
(5) Given a set of v's, can the form of L be ascertained?
It is almost certain that it cannot by any kMown means or in
any time imaginable but that is not a good reason for failing
or refusing to envisage the problem.
STATUTORY LAW VIEWED AS JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
I have said that the subject-matter of legal science is the dis-
tinctive behavior of judges and that the science of law must
consist essentially of categorical propositions setting forth such
behavior together with the evoking stimuli and the conditioning
circumstances. It is common to say, however, that not all law
is judge-made, that what is called statutory law is not judge-
made but is made by legislation. The distinction seems very
obvious at first. Will it bear close scrutiny? It may be doubted.
It appears to me that a statute (a verbal formula set up by a
legislature) is not itself a law but that, rightly conceived, a
statutory law is in fact the judicial interpretation of a statute.
That seems indisputable in the case of a statute so ill-drawn
that its meaning is obscure. Let us suppose, however, that a
statute is so clear that even an illiterate person, upon hearing
it read, would instantly understand it. Nevertheless a cout may,
if it will, assign to the statute a meaning obviously inconsistent
with the meaning it was evidently designed to convey. In that
case, if the court be one of the last resort, the assigned meaning,
the judicial interpretation, is, until reversed or altered, statutory
law. On the other hand, if the meaning declared by the court
coincide, as it normally will, with the evident meaning of the
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statute, such declared meaning is none the less an expressed
judicial interpretation, and, again, this interpretation is a statu-
tory law. The statute itself is to be rightly viewed, I believe,
as one, though it is often the controlling one, of the circum-
stances conditioning judicial behavior. Because that circum-
stance, when it is present, is so important, students of legal
science are confronted with a special problem. I mean the prob-
lem of rightly conceiving the relation between legislation and
judicial determination-between statute and law.
THE ROLE OF MATHEMATICAL METHOD
IN THE STUDY OF LEGAL SCIENCE
In studying judicial behavior it is very noteworthy that in all
or nearly all important cases the statement of a decision occurs
as part of a discourse purporting to set forth the principles and
processes by which the decision is arrived at and is held to be
justified. Such discourses constitute an immense literature, ever
growing. That literature presents certain very striking phenom-
ena to which students of legal science must necessarily give a
great deal of serious attention. These phenomena are of four
kinds or types as follows:
(1) Terms employed deliberately or unconsciously without
being defined. Such terms may be called primitive terms. Primi-
tive terms not only do occur but must occur, for no discourse
can define all of its terms without committing the unpardonable
sin of circularity.
(2) Numerous defined terms-defined, of course, by help of
the primitives. Definitions are not logical necessities but they
are economic ones.
(3) Propositions consciously or unconsciously taken for
granted, assumed without attempted proof. They may be called
primitive propositions or postulates. Postulates must occur, for
no discourse can, without self-stultification, undertake or pretend
to prove all of its propositions.
(4) Numerous "proved" propositions-ostensibly deduced
logically from postulates.
Accordingly it seems evident that any one of the branches of
legal science must confront the student with the following eight
problems:
(1) To detect and list the terms actually employed (in the
given branch) as primitives.
(2) To detect and list the terms ostensibly defined and to
examine the definitions with reference to their clarity, precision
and general availability.
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(3) To detect and list the propositions actually employed as
primitive propositions, or postulates.
(4) To detect and list the propositions ostensibly proved or
deduced and to scrutinize the proofs for their logical soundness
or unsoundness.
(5) To determine what terms it would be most expedient to
select for use as primitives.
(6) To construct the most available definitions of all other
important terms by means of the primitives.
(7) To determine what propositions it would be most ex-
pedient to select as primitive propositions, or postulates.
(8) To deduce all other propositions logically from the
chosen postulates.
Not only do the eight jroblems require to be solved for each
branch of legal science but-what is vastly more-they require
to be stated and solved for legal science as a whole.
WHAT IS THE USE OF MATHEMATICIZING?
It is natural and pertinent to ask what good can come from
mathematicizing a branch of legal science. As a brief general
answer to that question I would submit the following three
fairly obvious considerations:
(1) The mathematical method can never tell what the law is
or ought to be. It can tell what the law is or ought to be only
upon the assumption that certain postulates have been granted.
Nothing, however, but ex-perience can ultimately tell whether a
given system of postulates ought to be granted, ought, I mean,
in the interest of justice. But mathematics can help experience
in this matter, for it is precisely the peculiar office of mathe-
matics to deduce the consequences of a postulate system, and
it is perfectly evident that such a pre-experiential knowledge
of a postulate system's consequences must greatly facilitate the
task of experience in judging the merits of the system itself.
(2) The method in question converts any legal branch to
which it may be applied into an autonomo~s system, or doctrine,
in which the component propositions are logically ordered and
related. Such a system answers to a deep natural craving of
the human intellect-a craving that reaches at once for the con-
venient, for the economical, and for the aesthetic.
(3) An ensemble of experience-given propositions (like those
constituting any existing branch of law) never gets so thor-
oughly examined and criticized and understood as when the en-
semble is submitted to the severe processes of mathematicization.
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On the other hand, it seems probable that, if a legal branch
were reduced to a perfectly logical system, the very perfection
itself would make it somewhat harder to modify the system when
the interests of justice required such modification. But that con-
tingent disadvantage does not seem so very weighty compared
with the advantages mentioned.
In view of the above-indicated dependence of law upon extra-
legal variables, it is evident that the study of legal science
must reach far into many another field: history, scientific
method, mathematical method, psychology, sociology, axiology,
ethics, religion, political science, economic theory, industrial de-
velopment, and so on.
In this essay I have refrained from using the phrase "philoso-
phy" of law, because in my view present-day philosophy is not
something distinct from science but is literally a genuine part
thereof, as explained in The Pastures "of Wonder, above alluded
to.
